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Abstract: 
Humans readily generalize, applying prior knowledge to novel situations and stimuli. 
Advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence have begun to approximate and even 
surpass human performance, but machine systems famously struggle to generalize information 
to untrained situations. We present a model that demonstrates human-level extrapolatory 
generalization and does so by exploiting well-established principles from neuroscience. This 
model is trained to play one video game (Breakout) and performs one-shot generalization to a 
new game (Pong) with different rules, dimensions, and characteristics. The model generalizes 
because it learns structured representations that are functionally symbolic (viz., a role-filler 
binding calculus) from unstructured training data. It does so without feedback, and without 
requiring that structured representations are specified a priori. Specifically, the model uses 
neural co-activation to discover which characteristics of the input are invariant and to learn 
relational predicates, and oscillatory regularities in network firing to bind predicates to 
arguments. We argue that models of human cognition must account for far-reaching and 
flexible generalization, and that in order to do so, they must be able to discover symbolic 
representations from unstructured data, and ideally do so by capitalizing on basic principles 
from neurophysiology. Only then can models begin to adequately explain where human-like 
representations come from, why human cognition is the way it is, and why it continues to differ 
from machine intelligence in crucial ways.   
 
KEYWORDS: predicate learning, generalization, neural networks, symbolic-connectionism, 
video games, neural oscillations 
 
Summary: We present a machine system that learns predicates from experience, without 
feedback or pre-specified knowledge; the system uses neural oscillations that naturally occur 
in the network to compute. After learning, the system uses the predicates it learned from 
unstructured data to support one-shot generalization from one video game to another.  
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There is vibrant controversy about the relationship between artificial intelligence systems, the 
human mind, and the principles of neural computation (e.g., 1-5). For example, children can 
easily build Lego constructions in either a horizontal or vertical direction once they know how 
to attach the pieces together, yet a machine learning system would struggle to transfer its 
knowledge even in such a basic way1.  
 
This disconnect in behavior between child and machine highlights a core aspect of the human 
mind: the ability to generalize to situations ‘outside the training set’. In domains as various as 
sports, music, language, mathematics, or gaming, people learn from their environment, refine 
what they know from experience, and employ strategies that they learned in one context to 
solve problems in a new context. Despite its ubiquity in human cognition, however, the ability 
to generalize across contexts presents a striking lacuna for machine learning systems.  
 
Here we present a machine system that generalizes like the child playing with Legos. To 
demonstrate this point, we solve a classic generalization problem in machine learning (5): the 
transfer of knowledge and play behavior learned from one video game (Breakout, where a 
paddle hits a ball by moving along the horizontal axis and points are scored by hitting blocks), 
to a different game, (Pong, where two paddles hit a ball along the vertical axis and points are 
scored by hitting the ball past the opposite paddle). Being able to play Pong once you know 
how to play Breakout mimics the generalization behavior of humans and, importantly, contrasts 
starkly with current state-of-the-art machine systems. To our knowledge, no other machine 
system can play a new, untrained video game based only on representations learned from 
another game. 
 
Importantly, our system achieves generalization or task transfer outside the training set by 
learning functionally symbolic representations (viz., a role-filler binding calculus) from 
experience, in an unsupervised fashion (without feedback), and without requiring pre-specified 
structured (i.e., compositional or symbolic) knowledge. We call this process predicate 
learning. We show that the resulting representations allow the model to achieve one-shot 
generalization between the video games Breakout and Pong (as humans routinely do, and 
machine systems famously struggle with). Crucially, our system exploits model-internal 
'neural' oscillations in order to achieve predicate learning in a manner that is similar to how 
human cortical networks and neuronal assemblies communicate with and modulate each 
another (6). 
 
Recent advances in machine learning (e.g., 7-9) have produced deep neural networks (DNNs) 
that reach and even exceed human levels of performance on a range of cognitive tasks. For 
example, recent DNNs learned to master an impressive number of Atari games (9). DNNs are 
general, in that they can learn to perform a variety of tasks without a priori background 
knowledge. Nevertheless, while DNNs readily perform interpolation (i.e., generalization to 
untrained items from within the bounds of the training set, or which have the same statistical 
properties as the training data), they struggle to perform extrapolation (i.e., generalization to 
items from outside the bounds of the training set). While a human learner who plays one video 
game—like Breakout—will quickly generalize to playing a new game—like Pong—DNNs 
trained to play one game must be retrained in order to play any additional games (9).   
 
That DNNs have difficulty extrapolating their knowledge is well known and appears to stem 
from their explicit lack of structured representations (10-13). By contrast, accounts of how 
humans generalize are frequently based on powerful symbolic languages or graph grammars 
                                               
1 This example comes from Gary Marcus in the article http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/05/how-
researchers-are-teaching-ai-learn-child.  
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that include structured relations (predicates), which can be promiscuously applied to new 
arguments (14-17). Structured representations allow the flexible transfer of information across 
contexts because the same representations can be used to characterize very different situations 
(Fig. 1). For example, one recent model of hand-writing recognition (18) can learn to recognize 
and even recreate novel hand-written characters after only a single exposure, because it 
represents those characters in terms of predicates, attached-at-start(x,y), attached-along(x,y), 
and attached-at-end(x,y), that relate possible line segments together. However, models that 
exploit structured representations face a challenge that is complementary to that faced by 
DNNs: They require the modeler to specify the vital structured representations in advance of 
any learning (14-19). So, while structure-based models generalize more flexibly than DNNs, 
they do not possess the same capabilities to learn from limited starting states.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  
Representations of relations and predicates in two disparate domains: video games and tennis. Many of the same 
relations that support reasoning about a strategic shot in tennis allow also support reasoning about a strategic 
move in a game of Super Mario Bros. (e.g., the higher relation comes into play when planning a drop shot in 
tennis, or a jump attack by Mario).  
 
We describe a neural network model that bridges the gap between these frameworks. The 
model is a general learner that discovers powerful symbolic representations from experience. 
The model is trained via predicate learning, and the representations that it learns allow it to 
reach human-level performance on some tasks, and, crucially, to generalize and transfer that 
expertise in a human-like fashion, quickly (in one shot) and without explicit feedback. The 
architecture, called DORA (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; 20), is based on two influential 
ideas from cognitive science and neuroscience. First, learning and generalization depend upon 
a process of comparison (e.g., 21-23). Second, information in neural computing systems can 
be carried by the oscillatory regularities that emerge as its component units fire (e.g., 6, 24-27). 
In brief, DORA uses unsupervised comparison to discover which characteristics of the input 
are invariant, and to learn functional predicates; it then applies these predicates to arguments 
in a symbolic fashion, using oscillatory regularities to dynamically bind predicates and 
arguments. DORA learns representations that are functionally and formally symbolic from 
training data, without feedback, and without requiring that structured representations be 
specified a priori. We demonstrate that the capacity for predicate learning produces 
representations that, coupled with “off-the-shelf” preprocessing and reinforcement learning 
tools, support mastery of a video game, and, more importantly, that the representations then 
support transfer of expertise in that game to a new game in one shot, extrapolating knowledge 
in a manner that closely resembles human players.  
 
Predicate learning 
 
Our theory of predicate learning is instantiated in a neural network model called DORA 
(Discovery of Relations by Analogy; 20), which is descended from of the symbolic-
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connectionist system LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies; 15,16). 
DORA learns to represent structured (i.e., functionally symbolic) representations from 
unstructured examples without feedback. DORA is based on traditional neurocomputing 
principles but differs in important ways from conventional neural networks. Below we present 
an overview of the DORA model and how it performs predicate learning. Details of the 
operations described below can be found in 20, with the exception of the local energy 
operations that are described in detail in the Methods section. Full details of the entire model 
also appear in the Supplemental Methods. Code for the model is available online (see 
Acknowledgements). 
 
Table 1 summarizes the architectural assumptions of the model. The basic network 
macrostructure is presented in Fig. 2. DORA consists of a long-term-memory (LTM) composed 
of bidirectionally connected layers of nodes. We refer to nodes in LTM as token units (or 
tokens). Units in the lowest layer of LTM are connected to a pool of feature units. Token units 
are yoked to integrative inhibitors that integrate input from their yoked unit and active token 
units in higher layers, and fire after reaching a threshold. The yoked inhibitors serve the purpose 
of implementing phasic firing and refractory periods in the token units (which are important 
for implementing dynamic binding in the network; described below).  
 
Table 1. Architectural assumptions of the DORA model.  
Architectural	Structure	 Function	
Layered hierarchical network of 
bidirectionally connected units (token units) 
comprises a long-term memory (LTM).  
Allows the network to represent information 
in a hierarchy of conjunctive links.  
The lowest layer of token units is connected 
to a pool of feature units. 
Units that encode semantic features of a 
stimulus in the environment, or which were 
activated in elsewhere in the network 
Token units have falling phases in firing 
(implemented via integrative inhibitors 
yoked to each token unit).  
Allows oscillations and time sharing that 
underlie dynamic binding.  
Floating working memory banks within 
LTM, which correspond to potentiated units 
(or focus of attention (FOA) and active 
memory (AM) in cognitive frameworks).  
Correspond to potentiated units, or to the 
focus of attention (FOA) and active memory 
(AM) in cognitive frameworks. Allow for 
comparison between independent sets of 
units.  
Token units are laterally inhibitive (units in 
the same layer inhibit one another) within but 
not across floating banks.  
Allows units in AM to compete to respond to 
patterns of activations on the feature units. 
Important for time-based binding.  
Activation flows from FOA to other token 
units via activated feature units.  
Allows comparison across banks. Avoids the 
problems feed-forward architectures face 
where input and output are to definitionally 
independent spaces.  
Excitatory mapping connections learned 
between within layer co-active units in FOA 
and AM via modified Hebbian algorithm.  
Allows the system to learn correspondences 
between firing patterns in FOA and AM.  
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Fig. 2.  
Macrostructure of the DORA network. LTM (long-term memory) is composed of layers of bidirectionally 
connected units (called tokens) yoked to integrative inhibitors (each circle represents a token unit and its yoked 
inhibitor). Dashed boxes represent floating memory sets, potentiated units that are laterally inhibitive 
corresponding to DORA’s focus of attention (what the model is currently processing), and active memory (or 
working memory in cognitive terms).  
 
Floating memory sets, groups of potentiated units, correspond to attention/working memory 
(WM) within a cognitive framework. One floating memory set corresponds to DORA’s current 
focus of attention (FOA), one to DORA’s active memory (AM), and one to emerging memory 
(EM). Token units are laterally inhibitive (units in the same layer inhibit one another) within, 
but not across, sets. Activation in the model flows from the FOA to token units in the AM and 
LTM via the shared pool of feature units. Excitatory connections, called mapping connections, 
are learned within-layer between co-active units in FOA and AM via a modified Hebbian 
algorithm (16,20).  
 
DORA is a settling network and thus does not have inputs or outputs in the conventional sense. 
Rather, DORA has states that produce new states. DORA starts in some state (e.g., a set of 
units in FOA) and settles (e.g., with some units active in FOA and AM). Due to the refraction 
of nodes, this settling state will at some point become upset, and DORA will again settle, 
producing a new state (e.g., a different set of active units in FOA and AM), and so on. In each 
settled state, DORA attempts to find mapping between active units in FOA and AM, or to learn 
(as predicate learning or as generalization; see below).   
 
DORA’s functional processing is summarized in Fig. 3. All functional operations described in 
Fig. 3 are accomplished using traditional neurocomputing principles (20 and supplemental 
methods). DORA starts with a set of potentiated units in FOA (chosen at random from LTM, 
or based on DORA’s current perceptual state; e.g., a video-game screen shot). As DORA runs, 
units in FOA—as a consequence of lateral inhibition and yoked inhibitors—naturally oscillate. 
Activation flows from FOA to features and then to token units in the rest of LTM. Active units 
in LTM are retrieved into AM (become potentiated) using a Luce (28) choice rule. DORA 
learns mapping connections (positive weighted connections) between co-active units in FOA 
and AM. After mapping, DORA learns predicates (first single-place predicates, and eventually 
multi-place predicates) via unsupervised predicate learning. As a consequence of the temporal 
dynamics produced in the network, these predicates can be dynamically bound to arguments 
Features
Focus of attention Active memory
…
…
…
…
Mapping connection
Bidirectional excitatory connection
Dynamic memrory set with lateral inhibition 
Flow of activation 
LTM
Emerging memory
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(see below).2 Finally, the current instantiation of DORA exploits an energy signal that occurs 
naturally in distributed computing systems to discover an invariant signal for, and to learn a 
circuit to respond to, instances of similarity and relative magnitude (see below and Methods 
for details). As a result, the predicates that the network learns instantiate representations of 
relative magnitude.  
 
  
                                               2	DORA	learns	representations	that	are	formally	equivalent	to	a	role-filler	binding	calculus	(Doumas	&	Hummel,	2005;	2012).	In	a	role-filler	binding	calculus,	all	predicates	are	single-place,	and	multi-place	relations	are	represented	as	linked	sets	of	single-place	predicates.	For	example,	a	multi-place	concept	like	
above(x,y)	is	represented	as	higher(x)+lower(y),	where	the	agent	and	patient	roles	of	the	above	relation	are	represented	explicitly	and	linked	via	the	‘+’	operator.	A	role-filler	binding	system	is	formally	equivalent	in	expressive	power	to	a	traditional	predicate	system.		
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Processing	step	 Description	Items	F	in	FOA	 < Potentiated	units	in	FOA.		𝑤"𝜏$, 𝜏&, 𝜎() ← 𝐿𝐸"𝜏$, 𝜏&)	 < Update	weights	in	the	local	entropy	circuit.	Full	details	in	Methods.			
For	𝑖 ∈ 𝐹	:	 < F	is	the	units	at	the	highest	token	layer	for	any	set	of	connected	units.	
Until	𝑌$ > 𝜃$ 	:		 < While	unit	i’s	yoked	inhibitor	has	not	fired.		𝑎$ = 1	 < Activation	of	unit	i	clamped	to	1.		𝑛79⃖99	 < Inputs	to	all	network	units	j	updated.		𝑎& ← 𝑓"𝑛&)	 < Activations	and	states	of	all	network	units	j	updated.			 	 𝑌;9⃖99	 < Input	to	yoked	inhibitors	updated.		
If	𝑌; > 𝜃;	:		 < If	the	local	inhibitor	is	above	threshold.		𝐼=99⃗ 	 < Inhibitor	fires	(refresh	all	units	at	layer	L	of	unit	
k	and	below).		
End	If		 	
When	retrieving	:	 < When	the	network	is	retrieving	from	LTM.		𝐸(𝐺) ← 𝑓"𝐴(𝐺), 𝐴(𝐻)), 𝐻 ≠ 𝐺	 < Potentiated	units	into	AM	via	the	Luce	choice	rule.		
End	When	 	
When	mapping	:		 < During	mapping.		∆𝑚&; ← 𝑀"𝑎&, 𝑎;)	 < Mapping	connections	M	between	FOA	and	AM	updated	(20).		
End	When		 	
When	predicate	learning	:	 < During	predicate	learning	(20).		
If	𝑇(𝑚IJK,KL)	:		 < If	there	are	mapping	connections	between	units	in	FOA	and	AM.		𝐴"𝜏&,=MN) ← ~𝐴"𝜏P,=QN)	 < Token	unit	in	AM	layer	L=1	is	activated,	A,	when	no	tokens	at	higher	layers	are	active.			𝐴"𝜏&,=) ← 𝐴"𝜏P,=RN)		 < Token	unit	in	AM	layer	L,	above	a	layer	L-1	with	active	token	units,	is	activated.		∆𝑤&; ← 𝐻"𝑎&, 𝑎;)	 < Weights	updated	via	Hebbian	learning.			
End	If		 	
End	When			 	
When	refining	:	 < During	refinement	(schema	induction;	20).		
If	𝑇(𝑚IJK,KL)	:	 < If	there	are	mapping	connections	between	units	in	FOA	and	AM.	𝐴(𝜏&,TL) ← 𝑀"𝜏P,IJK, 𝜏U,KL)	 < Token	unit	j	in	EM	is	activated	matching	active	FOA	unit	with	mapping	connections.		∆𝑤&; ← 𝐻"𝑎&, 𝑎;)	 < Weights	updated	via	Hebbian	learning.			
End	When	 	
When	generalizing	:		 < During	generalization	(20).		𝐈𝐟	𝑇(𝑚IJK,KL) ∶	 < If	mapping	connections	between	units	in	FOA	and	AM.		𝐴(𝜏&,KL) ← ~𝑀"𝜏P,IJK)	 < Token	 unit	 j	 in	 AM	 is	 activated	matching	 active	FOA	units	with	no	mapping	connections.			𝑤&; ← 𝐻"𝑎&, 𝑎;)	 < Weights	updated	via	Hebbian	learning.			
End	If		 	
End	When		 	
End	Until		 	
If	𝑁𝑢𝑚"𝑤&;) < 2	:		 < If	token	units	j	is	not	multiply	connected.		𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜"𝑤&;)	 < Zero	weights	from	token	j.		
End	If	 	
End	For		 	
Fig. 3.  
Functional description of processing in DORA.  
 
Applied iteratively, these processes produce structured predicate representations from 
unstructured inputs and support relational generalization (extending knowledge from one 
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system to reason about another; see 20), both without supervision. These computations have 
allowed the model to account for over 50 phenomena from the literature on human cognitive 
development (20, 29-34), relational reasoning (20, 35-38), and language processing (39, 40).  
 
To illustrate the model’s operation, we describe the stages of the model as it learns predicates 
and relations and performs binding. These outcomes result from the architecture described 
directly above.  
 
DORA starts with representations of objects coded as flat vectors (e.g., of features). For the 
current simulations, we use a very basic visual preprocessor that performs edge detection (via 
contrast) to identify and encode simple objects. The preprocessor had an inbuilt bias: any 
enclosed edges were treated as a single object. The preprocessor returns an encoding of each 
object as in the form of retinal impingement and colour. This information roughly corresponds 
to the total retinal area of the object and the enervation of the superior, inferior, lateral, and 
medial rectus muscles in reaching the (rough) center of the object from a reference point (41) 
(this information is currently encoded as the raw pixels and direction (specific muscle) between 
the rough object center and the reference point; we use the edge of the image, although results 
are the same using a central reference point), and the RGB encoding of the pixels composing 
the object. One consequence of the particular encoding is that the model shows the same bias 
for the cardinal directions observed in humans (42). The preprocessor’s operations are all based 
on information available in the early visual system (e.g., the visual system detects edges by 
contrast (43) represents extent information in the retinal image in absolute terms (41, 44-46), 
but it remains a massive oversimplification of human vision. 
 
DORA isolates and explicitly represents features or properties of objects by exploiting the 
natural intersection highlighting that occurs when two distributed representations are compared 
(Fig. 4A). Comparing (and co-activating) distributed representations of items, Oi and Oj, 
naturally reveals shared and unshared features of the two items. Specifically, features shared 
by Oi and Oj will receive roughly twice as much input and, therefore, become roughly twice as 
active as unshared features (Fig. 4A,v). DORA exploits this emergent regularity by learning 
connections between a recruited unit, r1, and active feature units by Hebbian learning (Fig. 
4A,vii). The result is a unit explicitly encoding the intersection of the compared items, and a 
solution to the isolation problem. Concurrently, a recruited unit at a higher layer of the network 
learns connections between the active r1 and Oj units (Fig. 4A,viii), conjunctively coding a link 
between them.  
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Fig. 4.  
Learning in DORA. (A) Isolation and explicit representation of invariant properties via comparison. (i) Two 
objects, Oi and Oj, are in FOA and AM (respectively), and Oi becomes active. (ii) Oi passes activation to its 
constituent features. (iii) Oj becomes active. (iv) Oi and Oj are mapped. (v) Oi and Oj are coactive, and so any 
shared features receive roughly twice as much input and become roughly twice as active as unshared features. (vi) 
A unit r1 and a token unit at the layer above the active Oj unit are recruited and activated, and (vii) learn 
connections to the active units in proportion to their activation (via Hebbian learning). (viii) Unit r1 explicitly 
codes for the intersection of Oi and Oj. (B) Learned representations are dynamically bound to arguments by 
systematic phase-lag of firing. (i) The pair r1+Oj learned in (A), and another pair, rn+Ok learned as in (B). (ii) 
Unit coding for r1+Oj conjunction becomes active, and passes activation to the r1 and Oj units, which compete, 
via lateral inhibition, to become active. (iii) r1 becomes active first. (iv) Oj become active next. The direct 
sequence of firing marks the binding of r1 to Oj. (v-vii) A similar pattern emerges when the rn+Ok role-binding 
becomes active. (C) Lower arity representations are conjoined into multi-place relational structures. (i) Role-filler 
pairs r1+Oj and rn+Ok from (B) are compared to role-filler pairs r1+Ol and rn+Om (learned by the network at 
some other timepoint). (ii) As a result of phase-lag binding in (C), bound role-filler pairs will oscillate. Units 
coding for r1 in the focus of attention become active. (iii )Activation flows from the focus of attention to active 
memory via the shared feature units activating units coding for r1 in active memory. (iv) The network maps (bold 
red arrows) co-active units in focus of attention and active memory. (v) The units coding for Oi and Oj similarly 
become active, and the maps them. (vi) Units coding for rn then become active, and the network maps them. (vii) 
Units coding for the arguments of rn are similarly mapped. (viii) The network has learned mappings between 
corresponding (structurally similar) units in focus of attention and active memory. (ix) As a result of the predicate 
learning algorithm, a unit a higher layer of the network is recruited as the units in the focus of attention and active 
memory become active again. (x) The recruited unit learns connections to role-filler pairs as they become active, 
first the r1+Oj pair, (xi) then the rn+Ol pair. (xii) The result is a structure (nodes colored blue) that functions as a 
multi-place predicate. (D) Invariant responses to similarity and relative magnitude emerge when objects with 
absolute magnitudes are compared. (i) Two representations of objects (large circles) with different values on some 
dimension are compared. (ii) Magnitude representations are activated, and the objects compete, via lateral 
inhibition, to become active (red = more active unit). (iii). The object with the greater magnitude wins the 
competition—the invariant signal for greater magnitude—and learns a connection to a node indicating the 
competition winner. (iv) The object with the lesser magnitude becomes active next—the invariant signal for lesser 
magnitude—and learns a connection to a node indicating the competition loser.  
 
DORA dynamically binds the representations learned via comparison to arguments to produce 
functional single-place predicates. When laterally inhibitive units are linked by a conjunctive 
node, they will naturally oscillate out of synchrony and in direct sequence (phase-lag-1) when 
the conjunctive unit becomes active (Fig. 4B,i-v). DORA exploits this emergent oscillatory 
pattern as a binding signal. Specifically, bound units fire in direct sequence, and systematically 
out of synchrony with other bound pairs (Fig. 4B,vi-ix). In short, identity information is carried 
by what units are active, and binding information is carried by when those units are active. This 
binding signal is dynamic in that the same units are used to represent complementary bindings 
through different firing orders (e.g., binding r1 to object Oj and r2 to object Oi, amounts to the 
units coding for r1 firing, followed by the units for Oj, and then the units coding for r2 firing, 
followed by the units coding for Oi). As we demonstrate below the resulting representations 
are functional predicate-object, or role-filler, pairs.  
 
DORA solves the problem of learning higher-arity (i.e., multi-place) representations via 
comparison. As noted above, DORA learns representations in a role-filler format (47,48). That 
is, DORA learns a representation of a multi-place relation by linking single-place predicate 
representations of the constituent roles into a single structure (20). When structurally similar 
sets of bound elements are in FOA and AM (as in Fig. 4C,i), DORA will settle in states where 
corresponding units in FOA and AM are active together and are mapped (Fig. 4C,ii-vii). In 
short, as a consequence of mapping and dynamic binding corresponding units across FOA and 
AM will oscillate systematically (Fig. 4C,ii-vii). This pattern is a reliable signal that DORA 
exploits to learn multi-place relational structures. DORA recruits a unit in a higher layer of the 
network (Fig. 4C,ix), and learns connections between that unit and active conjunctive token 
units in the layer below by Hebbian learning (Fig. 4C,viii-xi).  
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The resulting structure (Fig. 4C,xii) is a functionally symbolic multi-place relational 
representation. At the layer of feature units, objects, properties, and roles are coded in a 
distributed fashion. At the next later, collections of properties are conjunctively coded as tokens 
of individual objects and predicates. At the next layer, role-filler pairs are conjunctively bound. 
At the top layer, conjunctively coded role-filler pairs are themselves linked into whole multi-
place relations. The resulting structure allows for storage in LTM. When the representation 
becomes active, dynamic binding information is carried in the temporal patterns of firing that 
emerge, with tokens for individual predicates and objects bound by their firing phase-lag (Fig. 
4B).  
 
Finally, the predicate representations that DORA learns represent relative relational concepts 
(e.g., “same”, “more”, and “less”) as DORA exploits the property that absolute magnitude 
information for spatial dimensions is encoded in an analog fashion by neural systems (28-30). 
When two objects, Oi and Oj, that differ in value on some magnitude dimension (e.g., size) are 
co-activated (Fig. 4D,i), and the units coding Oi and Oj compete to stay active (via lateral 
inhibition; Fig. 4D,ii). The object with the larger dimensional value will win the completion 
and become active first (as it is coded by a greater extent of units; Fig. 4D,iii), while the lesser 
object will lose and become active next (Fig. 4D,iv). By contrast, when two items of the same 
magnitude are compared, they will settle into a state of mutual co-activation. DORA exploits 
these invariant emergent patterns by learning specific responses to them. DORA learns to 
activate a unit (or set of units) in response to winning the competition (the invariant for 
“moreness”), another unit (or set of units) in response to losing the competition (the invariant 
for “lessness”), and another unit (or set of units) in response to mutually co-activation (the 
invariant for “sameness”), and learns connections between these units and any active object 
units via Hebbian learning (Fig. 3A,iii-iv). Details of learning this circuit in Methods.  
 
Results  
 
Our aim was to test generalization outside the training space. We compared two broad classes 
of implementations: one with predicate learning, and several without. We situated DORA’s 
predicate learning algorithm between a visual preprocessor (see above), and tabular Q-learning 
(49, 50) (see Fig. 5) in order to test whether predicate learning supports learning representations 
that allow a system to generalize outside the training space (i.e., to extrapolate).  
 
 
Fig. 5.  
Predicate learning in context. The DORA model is situated within a visual preprocessor, and a tabular Q-learning 
mechanism.  
 
We compared (1) an implementation of DORA with Q-learning against (2) DQN; (3) DQN 
with preprocessed inputs; (4)  a supervised (i.e., back-prop) deep neural network (DNN) with 
preprocessed inputs with fixed frame skipping, and (5) a supervised DNN with preprocessed 
inputs with fixed frame skipping; (6) Humans (two Breakout and Pong novices). The other 
networks served as control conditions to test whether predicate learning can underlie 
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extrapolatory generalization, and whether extrapolatory generalization can be achieved without 
predicate learning. In addition, we also ran simulations using DORA with Q-learning using 
random frame skipping as well as with supervised learning (see supplemental results).  
 
Specifically, we trained all these systems to play one videogame (Breakout), and then tested 
their ability to generalize to a different videogame (Pong) without any explicit training. Finally, 
we evaluated these systems' ability to switch back to playing the original game, after time spent 
learning to play the second.3 See Methods for details of all simulations.  
 
For the first 250 games of Breakout, DORA made random moves, generating game states from 
which it learned structured representations in an unsupervised manner as described above. 
DORA successfully learned predicate representations encoding to instances such as moreY 
(object1, object2) (effectively a representation of the relation higher), and moreX (object1, 
object2) (effectively a representation of the relation right-of)4. As demonstrated in the 
supplemental results, the representations it learned are functionally symbolic.  
 
DORA then attempted to learn to play Breakout using the representations that it had learned 
during the first 250 games to represent the current game screen and then made a response. 
Associations between these learned representations and successful moves were learned via 
tabular Q-learning (e.g., 49, 50). While much more sophisticated methods for representational 
selection exist, we employed this very simple solution as a proof of concept.  
 
Fig. 6A shows the performance of all networks on Breakout as an average score of the last 100 
games played (after reaching plateauing performance), and a high score. Unsurprisingly, all 
systems performed quite well, reaching levels of performance that matched or exceeded human 
participants.    
 
 
Fig. 6.  
Results of game play simulations with Humans, DORA, the DQNs and the DNNs. Error bars represent 2 stderrors. 
(a) Performance humans and networks on Breakout as an average and high score. (b) Results of humans and 
networks playing Pong after training on Breakout (results are reported as reinforcement score calculated as own 
score minus opponent score). (c) Results of humans and networks when returning to play Breakout after playing 
or learning to play Pong.  
 
                                               
3 While we discuss the generalization in terms of learning to play Breakout and generalizing to playing Pong, the 
results are the same when training moves in the opposite direction (i.e., training on Pong and generalizing to 
Breakout).  4	We	use	terms	such	as	“moreY”	or	“higher”	to	describe	the	relations	that	DORA	learned	for	the	purposes	of	expositional	clarity.	For	example,	the	predicate	that	we	label	“moreY”	was	the	predicate	representation	that	DORA	learned	that	fit	instances	when	one	item	was	above	another.	DORA	did	not	receive	or	utilize	any	such	labels.	
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We then tested the capacity of the networks to play a new videogame, Pong. DORA had learned 
to play Breakout by learning associations between relational configurations and actions. 
Because DORA’s representations of these relational configurations are effectively symbolic, 
they apply readily to untrained situations; that is, the predicates DORA uses to describe a 
relational configuration in Breakout can apply—or be bound to—items in any other situation 
(including novel situations; see also supplemental results). During its first game of Pong, 
DORA represented the game state using the relations it had learned playing Breakout. DORA 
discovered a correspondence between the action sets in the two games: particularly, 
moreY/lessY of the paddle (the paddle moves up and down) in Pong and moreX/lessX of the 
paddle (the paddle moves horizontally) in Breakout. This correspondence allowed DORA to 
infer via relational generalization (16,20; details in Methods) the relational configurations that 
reward specific moves in Pong. For example, just as moreX (ball, paddle) tends to reward a 
moreX move of the paddle in Breakout, moreY (ball, paddle) rewards a moreY move of the 
paddle in Pong.  
 
Fig. 6B shows the performance of a human player and the networks on the first game of Pong 
after training on Breakout and the average performance over the first 100 games playing Pong. 
Like a human player, DORA performed at a high level on Pong on a single exposure to the 
game, and continued to play Pong at a high level. By contrast, all other networks showed poor 
performance—which is unsurprising given previous results using DNNs and transferring to 
different contexts (as noted above; 1-5, 14-16, 47, 48).  
 
Finally, we trained the DQNs and DNNs on Pong. We then tested the capacity of the networks 
to return to playing Breakout. Fig. 6C shows the performance of a human player and the 
networks on the first game returning to play Breakout. Like a human player, DORA returned 
to playing the original game with little difficulty. By contrast, the other networks, showed poor 
performance, indicating that learning to play a new game interferes with the capacity to play 
old games.5  
 
Importantly, the generalization failure of the networks using the same visual processing as 
DORA demonstrates that the visual processing does not produce representations that support 
the generalization performance demonstrated by DORA. Using both Q-learning and supervised 
learning, the unstructured (i.e., non-symbolic) representations produced by the visual processor 
and the DQN did not support extrapolatory generalization, while the predicate representations 
learned by DORA did.  
 
General Discussion 
 
We have shown that a machine system can perform extrapolatory generalization through 
predicate learning. DORA used predicate learning to discover symbolic representations from 
video game screen shots without feedback, and without assuming any structured 
representations a priori. Crucially, the predicate representations that DORA learned allowed it 
to extrapolate its knowledge to untrained situations. Specifically, the model was able to use the 
representations that it learned playing Breakout to successfully play a new game, Pong. 
Importantly, just as with human players, generalizing to a new game like Pong was fast (one-
shot) and did not affect the system's ability to play the previously learned game. To our 
knowledge, we present the first demonstration of human-like generalization, or extrapolation, 
                                               5	While	recent	advances	such	as	(51)	have	shown	how	such	catastrophic	forgetting	can	be	avoided	in	neural	networks,	importantly,	these	systems	rely	on	interleaved	training	(i.e.,	training	on	all	to-be-learned	tasks	simultaneously).	Block	training,	like	we	use	(and	which	humans	often	engage	in)	still	produces	problems	for	DNNs.		
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in a machine system that does not assume structured representations to begin with. Importantly, 
the solution makes use of well-established neurocomputational principles. 
 
Humans radically outperform machines in numerous domains, particularly when making 
inferences. The power of human generalization appears to stem from our ability to use 
structured representations (e.g., 15-19). DORA generalizes to untrained contexts because it 
uses structured representations to reason about those contexts. However, unlike other 
structured models, DORA learns the structured representations that it uses rather than assuming 
them a priori. The ability to discover structured representations from experience advances 
models of human cognition, exceeds the performance of current DNNs on video game transfer, 
and extends the principles of general machine learning by enabling extrapolatory 
generalization.  
 
Of course, DORA still radically underperforms human behavior in general (humans do much 
more than play a few video games). People have much richer mental representations, which 
they acquire from a wide range of experiences in a myriad of contexts over their lives. 
However, the fact that we could approximate human-like performance using only structured 
representations of relative dimensions, speaks to the power of these representations (cf. 52-55).  
 
A predicate learning approach offers an account of how complex concepts might develop 
without the need to hardwire or encode the necessary information or structure into the system 
a priori. As such, we address limitations of current structure-based accounts of cognition (e.g., 
15-19), and offer a solution to the classic generalization problem that DNNs face (1,3-5). The 
ability to learn predicates from experience, and to generalize those representations to new 
inputs and contexts, may have substantial impact on theories of human reasoning, language 
representation and processing (39,56).  
 
Though we do not assume innate representational types, we do not believe that the expressive 
power of our system negates the possibility that innate structures and biases exist in the human 
brain (57). Predicate learning makes a few clear claims about what infrastructure might be 
present in order to learn human-like structured representations. First, the system needs an 
innate or assumed ability to separate and compare streams of information (i.e., in banks of units 
connected to the same perceptual layer). Such a computational structure implies, for instance, 
a form of perceptual memory. Second, the system needs the capacity to learn to respond to 
temporal signals. In our network, this capacity is partially realized by layers of laterally 
inhibitive units. Beyond these computational primitives, other innate capacities or knowledge 
may also exist (e.g., biases to attend to specific kinds of information), but we do not need to 
assume them in order to learn representations that support human-like extrapolatory 
generalization.  
 
The mechanism we have identified can be extended to more complex structures and to 
generalization across a wider range of experiences. This extension is tractable in two ways: 
first, under predicate learning, additional training, especially across different contexts and 
datasets, will result in richer representations which become more articulated and specified with 
experience. Second, predicate learning supports combining simple representations into more 
complex structures as needed (58, 59). The ability to identify useful combinations of simpler 
relational concepts can bootstrap learning more complex concepts. For instance, a complex 
concept like support might be built out of simpler concepts (e.g., a contact point of the 
supporting object lower than the contact point of the supported object). By combining our 
approach with more sophisticated reinforcement and model selection algorithms (e.g., 18,19), 
we might find a strong way forward, with our system providing an account of where the 
16 
Predicate learning and neural oscillations 
   
 
   
structured representations that form the basis of more complex models come from in the first 
place.   
 
Finally, we emphasize the fact that the model was able to discover and learn structured 
representations from experience because it exploits regularities of network behavior in a 
distributed computing system. We believe that this solution represents a fundamental formal 
and neurophysiological alignment between how human-like representations can be achieved in 
a system that learns, and how distributed neural computing systems, including cortical 
assemblies, process information (see 39 for a discussion; 24,25 for a historical precedent). 
Neural oscillations, or brain rhythms, (6) have long been implicated as indices of neural 
information processing (e.g., 60) in many systems, even when those systems differ in scale and 
configuration (61) and have changed the nature of theories of the neural implementation of 
human memory (62) and of cortical speech and language processing (63). Learning symbolic 
structure from signals that naturally occur in distributed computing systems like the brain offers 
a promising avenue of research whereby the computational principles that yield the highest 
forms of the human mind (e.g., relational reasoning, formal and natural language processing) 
can be realized in systems that are based on the computational primitives of neurophysiological 
systems. Being able to generalize in a human-like way, or extrapolate symbolic structure, while 
using representations that are learned from experience is, in our view, a defining feature of the 
human mind. Capturing this ability in a machine system formalizes a core part of what it means 
to think like a human.  
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Methods 
The current version of DORA is based on (20), with the addition of a local energy circuit that allows 
the model to learn invariant responses to instances of similarity and relative magnitude in pixel space. 
The DORA model is described in detail in (20) and also in the Supplemental Methods. Source code is 
available online (see Acknowledgements).  
 
Below we describe the local energy circuit, and how it is learned. Throughout this section we use ni to 
denote input to unit i, ai to denote the activation of unit i, and wij to denote the connection weight 
between units i and j. We then describe methods for game play and generalization in DORA, and the 
other networks used for testing (see main text).  
 
Local energy circuit 
 
The local energy circuit consists of two layers of nodes. The top layer, E takes input from any active 
predicate token units (we refer to predicate and object tokens as POs) in the focus of attention (FOA). 
The bottom layer, A is connected to the feature units. Units in E and A are modified sigmoidal threshold 
units. Units in E and A are laterally inhibitive (i.e., units in A inhibit all other units in A, and units in E 
inhibit all other units in E).  
 
Input, ni, to units i in E and A is calculated as: 
 𝑛$ =a𝑎&𝑤$&& − 𝜌$ 
(1) 
 
Where, for E units, j are all units connected to i including all active POs (token units for predicates and 
objects; 20 or Supplemental Methods for details) in the FOA and all units j¹i in E, and ri is the refraction 
of unit i, and for A units j are all units connected to unit i, including all units in E and all units j¹i in A. 
Weights between POs and units in E are initialized to values between .01 and 1, weights between units 
in E are initialized to -1. Weights between units and E and A are initialized to random numbers between 
0 and 0.9, and weights between units in A are initialized to -1 
 
The refraction, ri is given by the equation:  
 𝜌$ = 1. 1 + .0001𝑒P 
(2) 
 
Where, x is the number of iterations since unit i last fired.  
 
Activation, ai of units in E is calculated using the function:  
 ∆𝑎$ = 𝛾 11 + 𝑒R;((hRij) − 𝜂𝑎$ − 𝐿𝐼 
(3) 
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Where, qA is the threshold on unit in E (set randomly to a value between .4 and .8), k is a ramp parameter, 
dictating the rate of rise of the sigmoid (=10), g is a growth parameter, h is a leak parameter, and LI is 
the activation of the local inhibitor (a global refresh signal given when no active PO units are present 
in the FOA (see 20 and supplemental methods for details)).  
 
Activation, ai of units in A is calculated using the function:  
 𝑎$ = 11 + 𝑒R;((hRij) − 𝐿𝐼 
(4) 
 
Where, qA is the threshold on threshold unit in A (=.5), and k=10.  
 
Connection weights between units in A and a subset (10) of feature units are set to random values of 
between 0 and 1.  
 
Connections between units in E and A, and between are updated by the equation: 
 ∆𝑤$& = 𝑎$"𝑎& − 𝑤$&) 
(5) 
 
Where, i and j refer to units in A and E respectively for learning connections between units in E and A, 
and A and feature units respectively for learning connections between A and feature units.  
 
During magnitude comparison, PO units compete via lateral inhibition to become active (20). PO units 
are connected to semantic units indicating their absolute magnitude, with greater magnitudes encoded 
by larger numbers of units (see above). As a consequence, when the two PO units code different 
absolute magnitudes, the PO unit connected to the greater magnitude will win the completion to become 
active and inhibit the PO unit connected to the lesser magnitude.  
 
When the PO units settle, some E units will fire most strongly when there is a single active PO unit (as 
when two different magnitudes are compared), and others when there are two active PO units (as when 
two similar magnitudes are compared). Units in E pass activation to units in A. Active units in A then 
pass activation to any feature units to which they are connected. Feature units that are most strongly 
connected to units in A that are active early in firing become the invariants for “more”. The active PO 
unit learns a connection to the “more” semantics by Eq. 5. When the inhibitor on the active PO fires, 
the active PO unit is inhibited to inactivity, and the local inhibitor (LI) fires. The LI inhibits units in A, 
allowing units in A that are active later in firing to become active. Feature units that are most strongly 
connected to units in A that are active later in firing become the invariants for “less”. The active PO 
unit learns a connection to the “less” semantics (by Eq. 5).  
 
When both PO units code for the same extent, they settle into a stable state of mutual activation. Two 
active PO units will activate gating node G. Node G inhibits nodes E and passes activation the nodes in 
A.  
 
Learning representations from screens 
 
We used DORA to simulate learning structured representations from screen shots from the game 
Breakout. This simulation aims to mirror what happens when a child (or adult) learns from experience 
in an unsupervised manner (without a teacher or guide). We then used simple Q learning to teach DORA 
how to play Breakout using its learned representations.6  
 
                                               
6 We describe the results in terms of DORA learning to play Breakout and generalizing to Pong, but results were 
the same when run in the other direction (i.e., train on Pong and generalize to Breakout).  
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We started with screenshots from Breakout, experienced during 250 games with random move 
selection. Each screen from each game was processed with the visual pre-processor that identified 
objects and returned the raw pixel values as features of those objects. When learning in the world, 
objects have several extraneous properties. To mirror this point, after visual pre-processing, each object 
was also attached to a set of 100 additional features selected randomly from a set of 10000 features. 
These additional features were included to act as noise, and to make learning more realistic. (Without 
these noise features, DORA learned exactly as described here, only more quickly.)   
 
DORA learned from object representations in an unsupervised manner. On each learning trial, DORA 
selected one pair of objects from the current screenshot at random. DORA attempted to characterize 
any relations that existed between the objects using any relations it has previously learned (initially, it 
had learned nothing, and so nothing was returned). DORA selected a dimension at random and ran the 
two objects through the local energy circuit over that dimension. If the semantics returned matched 
anything in LTM (e.g., “more” and “less” “x”), then DORA used that representation from LTM to 
characterize the current objects. DORA then ran (or attempted to run) its retrieval, mapping, local 
energy, predication, multi-place relation learning, and refinement routines (see 20 and above), and 
stored the representations that it learned. We placed one constraint on DORA’s retrieval algorithm such 
that more recently learned items were favored for retrieval. Specifically, with probability .6, DORA 
attempted to retrieve from the last 100 representations that it had learned. This constraint followed our 
assumption that items learned more recently are more salient and more likely to be available for 
retrieval.  
 
Q-learning for game play 
 
We used DORA’s learned relations to describe each screen in terms of relations between the 
different objects and thus to form a representation of any given screen state. For a given screen, 
DORA used the representations it had previously learned to represent the relations between 
objects. During predicate learning, DORA had learned a representation of successive states as 
earlier and later in game play, so DORA used the representation of key objects on the current 
screen and an immediately previous screen. For any pair of objects, if DORA had learned a 
representation that characterized the relation between the two objects (in LTM and as measured 
by the energy circuit), DORA used that representation the characterize the objects.  
 
The relations were then used to form a table of encountered relational states and used Q-
learning (Watkins, 1989) to learn the approximate action-value function for Breakout. We used 
a rule length constraint of two relations per state, reflecting the simplicity of the game and the 
WM capacity exhibited by humans (Cowen, 2001). We trained DORA decreasing the learning 
rate linearly from 0.1 to 0.05 and the exploration rate linearly from 0.1 to 0.01 throughout the 
training session. We saved the version of the table that yielded the maximum score during the 
session.  
 
Generalization in DORA 
 
To generalize between games, DORA uses mapping and relational generalization (16,20). Broadly, 
DORA uses the move selection it has learned previously, maps this representation to the move selection 
for Pong, and then generalizes a rule for move selection in Pong using relational generalization; both 
are established algorithms used in models of relational reasoning. First, the representation of the moves 
available to DORA (sampled randomly during the first exposure to Pong) were placed in the focus of 
attention. The rules learned during game play—represented using the predicates DORA learned—were 
placed in the active memory. DORA attempted to map the representations in the focus of attention to 
those in the active memory, and then used relational generalization to infer rules for move selections 
based on the mappings it discovered. We note that the predicates were learned by DORA, the rules are 
associations between game states and moves that are learned via tabular q-leaning.  
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For example, the moves moreY (paddle, paddle2), moreY (paddle2, paddle), sameY (paddle, paddle2)—
i.e., the moves available in the game of Pong—would be placed in the focus of attention. During 
reinforcement learning, DORA learned that relations between the ball and paddle and the trajectory of 
the ball predicted proper move selection. Specifically, DORA learned that the state moreX (ball, paddle) 
with ball in state moreX (ball2, ball1) (i.e., the ball was currently at a position of further along that x-
axis than it had been in the previous screen) predicted moving right, i.e., moreX (paddle2, paddle), that 
the state moreX (paddle, ball) and moreX (ball1, ball2) predicted moving left, i.e., moreX (paddle, 
paddle2), that the state sameX (ball, paddle) predicted making no move, i.e., sameX (paddle, paddle2), 
and so on. These representations were placed in the active memory. DORA then attempted to map the 
representations in the focus of attention to those in the active memory. Because of the shared relational 
and object similarity, moreY (paddle, paddle2) in the focus of attention mapped to moreX (paddle, 
paddle2) in the active memory, moreY (paddle2, paddle) in the focus of attention mapped to moreX 
(paddle2, paddle) in the active memory, and sameY (paddle, paddle2) in the focus of attention mapped 
to sameX (paddle, paddle2) in the active memory. Through relational generalization, DORA then filled 
in the missing rule information for the Pong game states.  
 
More precisely, after mapping, DORA placed a representation of a rule in the focus of attention, and 
the mapped move from Pong in the active memory. For example, DORA might place the rule moreX 
(ball, paddle) & moreX (ball2, ball1), then move = right, i.e., moreX (paddle2, paddle) in the focus of 
attention, and the mapped moreY (paddle, paddle2) in the active memory (Fig. 7A). During mapping, 
DORA mapped the representations moreX(paddle2, paddle1) to moreY (paddle2, paddle1), reflecting 
the discovery of the correspondence between the move set in Breakout and in Pong (Fig. 7B; mappings 
depicted as green double-arrowed lines). The relational generalization algorithm is a self-supervised 
learning algorithm (see 8,12). During self-supervised learning, if no token units are active in the active 
memory to match active token units in the focus of attention, DORA will activate token units in the 
active memory that match active token units in the focus of attention. As detailed in Eq. A15, when a 
token unit j in the focus of attention is active, it will produce a global inhibitory signal to all active 
memory units to which it does not map. A uniform inhibition in the active memory signals DORA to 
activate a unit of the same type (i.e., P, RB, PO) in the active memory as the active token unit in the 
focus of attention. Therefore, as the representation of moreX (ball, paddle) becomes active in the focus 
of attention (Fig. 7C), the units for moreX and lessX and paddle, all map to items in the active memory, 
while the units for ball and the moreX+ball, lessX+paddle, and the relation moreX (ball, paddle) map to 
nothing in the active memory. In response to this signal, DORA recruits nodes in the active memory 
with no strong connections to match the active and unmapped P, RB, and PO units in the focus of 
attention (Fig. 7D). These units then learn connections via Hebbian learning (Fig. 7E). The same process 
will occur as the representation of moreX (ball2, ball1) becomes active in the focus of attention (Fig. 
7F-H). Through relational generalization, DORA matches the relational pattern of the focus of attention 
rule with the available units in the active memory. The result is a representation of structurally similar 
rule: moreY (ball, paddle) & moreY (ball2, ball1), move = up, i.e., moreY (paddle2, paddle) (Fig. 7I). 
This process was repeated for the other learned rules.  
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Fig. 7. 
Graphical depiction of relational generalization in DORA. (A-B) a representation of the rule moreX (ball, paddle) 
& moreX (ball2, ball1), move = up, i.e., moreX (paddle2, paddle) is placed in the focus of attention, and mapped 
to the representation of moreY (paddle2, paddle1) in the active memory (green double arrowed lines). (C) The 
representation of moreX (ball, paddle) becomes active in the focus of attention, and some active units have nothing 
to map to in the active memory. (D) DORA recruits and activates units to match the unmapped focus of attention 
units, and learns connections between active token units in the active memory (open arrowed lines). The result is 
a representation of moreY (ball, paddle) in the active memory. (E-G) The same process occurs when moreX 
(paddle2, paddle1) becomes active in the focus of attention. (I) The end result is a representation of the rule: 
moreY (ball, paddle) & moreY (ball2, ball1), move = up, i.e., moreY (paddle2, paddle).  
 
Deep Q-Network  
 
A Deep Q-Network (DQN; 9) was trained to play Breakout and Pong. The raw 210 × 160 frames were 
pre-processed by first converting their RGB representation to grey-scale and down-sampling it to a 105 
× 80 image. We stacked the last 4 consecutive frames to form the input each state.  
 
The input to the neural network was the 105 × 80 × 4 pre-processed state. The first hidden convolutional 
layer applied 16 filters of size 8 x 8 with stride 4 with a relu activation function. The second hidden 
convolutional layer applied 32 filters of size 4 x 4 with stride 2 with a relu activation function. The third 
hidden layer was fully connected of size 256 with a relu activation function. The output layer was fully 
connected with size 6 and a linear activation function.  
 
We implemented all the procedures of (9) to improve training stability, in particular: (a) We used 
memory replay of size 1,000,000. (b) We used a target network which was updated every 10,000 
learning iterations. (c) We fixed all positive rewards to be 1 and all negative rewards to be −1, leaving 
0 rewards unchanged. (d) We clipped the error term for the update through the Huber loss.  
 
We also ran the same network using the input from the visual preprocessor described above.  
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Deep neural network 
 
We trained a deep neural network (DNN; 8) in a supervised manner to play Breakout and Pong and 
tested generalization between games. One network was trained using random frame skipping and the 
other with fixed frame skipping.  
 
The inputs to the network were the output of the visual preprocessor described above. Specifically, the 
network took as input the x and y positions of the ball and player-controlled paddle, as well as the left 
paddle for Pong (left as zeros when playing Breakout). The input to the neural network was a vector of 
size 24 corresponding to the pre-processed last seen 4 frames. This was fed to three fully connected 
layers of size 100 each with a relu activation function. The output layer was fully connected with size 
6 and a softmax activation function.  
 
The criteria for training was the correct action to take in order to keep the agent-controlled paddle 
aligned with the ball. In Breakout if the ball was to the left of the paddle the correct action las ‘LEFT’, 
if the ball was to the right of the paddle the correct action was ‘RIGHT’ and if the ball and the paddle 
were at the same level on the x-axis the correct action was ‘NOOP’. In Pong if the ball was higher than 
paddle the correct action was ‘RIGHT’, if the ball was lower than paddle the correct action was ‘LEFT’ 
and if the ball and the paddle were at the same level on the y-axis the correct action was ‘NOOP’. This 
action was encoded as a one-hot vector (i.e., activation of 1 for the correct action and cero for all other 
actions).  
 
Data and source code availability:  
The data generated and presented in the current study, and source code are available from 
github.com/alexdoumas/BrPong_18. 
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Supplemental results 
 
Additional tests of the symbolic adequacy of the learned representations  
 
The representations that DORA learns should behave like structured relational representations. 
That is, the representations DORA learns must meet the requirements of human relational 
representations. While almost any structured representations will support analogical mapping 
some more substantive hallmarks of relational representations (see 22, 73) are that they, (i) 
form the basis for solving cross mappings; (ii) support mapping similar, but non-identical 
predicates; (iii) support mapping objects with no featural overlap, including completely novel 
objects, if they play similar roles; and (iv) form the basis of overcoming the n-ary restriction.  
 
During a cross-mapping, an object (object1) is mapped to a featurally less similar object 
(object2) rather than a featurally more similar object (object3) because it (object1) plays the 
same role as the less similar object (object2). For example, if cat1 chases mouse1 and mouse2 
chases cat2, then the structural analogical mapping places cat1 into correspondence with 
mouse2 because both play the chaser role. The ability to find such a mapping is a key property 
of genuinely relational (i.e., as opposed to feature-based) processing (see, e.g., 73-76). Cross-
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mappings serve as a stringent test of the structure sensitivity of a representation as they require 
violating featural or statistical similarity.  
 
We tested the relations that DORA had learned in the previous part of this simulation for their 
ability to support cross-mappings. We selected two of the refined relations that DORA had 
learned previously at random, such that both selected representations coded for the same 
relation (e.g., both coded for taller, or both coded for same-width). We bound the relations to 
new objects, creating two new propositions, P1 and P2 such that the agent of P1 was 
semantically identical to the patient of P2 and patient of P1 was semantically identical to the 
agent of P2. For example, P1 might be taller (square, circle) and P2 might be taller (circle, 
square). DORA then attempted to map P1 onto P2. We were interested in whether DORA 
would map the square in P1 onto the circle in P2 (the correct relational mapping) or simply 
map the square to the square and the circle to the circle.  We repeated this procedure 10 times 
(each time with a different randomly-chosen pair of relations). In each simulation, DORA 
successfully mapped the square in P1 to the circle in P2 and vice-versa (because of their 
bindings to mapped relational roles).  DORA’s success indicates that the relations it learned in 
the first part of this simulation satisfy the requirement of supporting cross-mapping. DORA 
successfully solves cross-mappings because the correspondences that emerge between 
matching predicates and their corresponding RBs, during asynchronous binding force 
relationally similar objects into correspondence. For example, consider a case when DORA 
attempts to map taller (square, circle) in the focus of attention, and taller (circle, square) in the 
active memory. When the more-height+square role-binding becomes active in the focus of 
attention, because of asynchronous binding, the units coding for more-height will become 
active first, followed by the units coding for square. When more-height is active in the focus 
of attention, it will activate more-height and its corresponding RB, more-height+circle, in the 
active memory. When the units coding for square subsequently become active in the focus of 
attention, the active more-height+circle RB unit in the active memory (already in 
correspondence with the active more-height+square RB unit in the focus of attention) will 
activate the square unit, thus putting circle and square into correspondence, and allowing 
DORA to map them.  
 
We then tested whether the relations that DORA had learned would support mapping to similar 
but non-identical relations (such as mapping taller to greater-than) and would support mapping 
objects with no semantic over-lap, including novel objects, that play similar roles. Humans 
successfully map such relations (22, 73), an ability that depends on the semantic-richness of 
our relational representations. We selected two of the refined relations that DORA had learned 
during the previous part of this simulation, R1 and R2 (e.g, taller(x,y) or wider(x,y)). Crucially, 
R1 and R2 both coded for SRM across different dimensions (e.g., if R1 coded taller, then R2 
coded wider). Thus, each role in R1 shared 50% of its semantics with a corresponding role in 
R2 (e.g., the role more-height has 50% of its semantics in common with the role more-width). 
To assure that no mappings would be based on object similarity, none of the objects that served 
as arguments of the relations had any semantic overlap at all. To ensure that the mapping would 
work with completely novel objects, we created objects composed from semantic units that we 
added to DORA solely for these simulations (i.e., these were semantic units DORA had not 
“experienced” previously). We repeated this process 10 times, each time with a different pair 
of relations from DORA’s LTM. Each time, DORA mapped the agent role of R1 to the agent 
role of R2 and the patient role of R1 to the patient role of R2, and, despite their lack of semantic 
overlap, corresponding objects always mapped to one another (because of their bindings to 
mapped roles).  
 
Finally, we tested whether the representations that DORA had learned would support violating 
the n-ary restriction: the restriction that an n-place predicate may not map to an m-place 
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predicate when n ≠ m. Almost all models of structured cognition follow the n-ary restriction 
(namely, those that represent propositions using traditional propositional notation and its 
isomorphs; see 15). However, this limitation does not appear to apply to human reasoning, as 
evidenced by our ability to easily find correspondences between, say, bigger (Sam, Larry) on 
the one hand and small (Joyce) or big (Susan), on the other (74).  
 
To test DORA’s ability to violate the n-ary restriction, we randomly selected a refined relation, 
R1, that DORA had learned in the previous part of this simulation. We then created a single 
place predicate (r2) that shared 50% of its semantics with the agent role of R1 and none of its 
semantics with the patient role. The objects bound to the agent and patient role of R1 each 
shared 50% of their semantics with the object bound to r2. DORA attempted to map R1 to r2. 
We repeated this process 10 times, each time with a different relation from DORA’s LTM, and 
each time DORA successfully mapped the agent role of R1 to r2, along with their arguments. 
We then repeated the simulation such that r2 shared half its semantic content with the patient 
(rather than agent) role of R1. In 10 additional simulations, DORA successfully mapped the 
patient role of R1 to r2 (along with their arguments).  In short, in all our simulations DORA 
overcame the n-ary restriction, mapping the single-place predicate r2 onto the most similar 
relational role of the multi-place relation R1.  
 
Finally, as noted above, DORA also learned representations of greater (x,y) and same (x,y) that 
were independent of any particular dimensions (i.e., relations that coded strongly for only the 
invariant features of more & less and same, that were otherwise not strongly connected to any 
other semantic features). Importantly, these representations also met all the requirements of 
structured relational representations. We ran the exact same tests for cross-mapping, mapping 
arguments with no semantic overlap based on shared roles, and violating the n-ary restriction 
that are described above, but using the representations of abstract magnitude (i.e., greater (x,y)) 
that DORA had learned during training. Just as with DORA’s dimensional SRM 
representations, DORA’s more abstract SRM representations successfully performed a cross-
mapping in 10 out of 10 simulations, mapped arguments with no semantic overlap based only 
on shared roles in 10 out of 10 simulations and overcame the n-ary restriction in 10 out of 10 
simulations.  
 
 
Supplemental methods: Details of DORA’s Operation 
 
DORA’s (see 20) processing architecture is a layered network of bidirectionally connected 
units. The long-term-memory (LTM) bank consists of 3 layers of units (see Fig. 2). The bottom 
layers of LTM is connected to the feature (or semantic) layer. Additionally, DORA has 3 
mutually exclusive banks of units, the focus of attention/driver (FOA), the active 
memory/recipients (AM), and the emerging-active-memory/emerging-recipient (EM). These 
banks are identical in structure to LTM, and also all connect to the feature unit bank. FOA 
controls the flow of activation in DORA. Units in FOA pass activation to the feature units. 
Because the feature units are connected to all other banks, activation flows from FOA to units 
in the other banks. Currently, we are agnostic as to whether FOA, AM, and the EM are 
implemented as processing windows that recruit specific units in LTM (as they are currently 
implementes; e.g., 63), or independent banks of units.  
 
Initially, representations in DORA are delivered by the front-end processor as objects coded as 
flat feature vectors (see Figure S1A). (In terms of cortical computation, feature nodes can be 
thought of as aggregate units, perceptual representations, or activation states over networks.)  
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Fig, S1.  
Representations in DORA. (a) DORA’s starting state. DORA begins with representations of objects connected to 
features. (b) Representation of the proposition bigger (cup, ball) instantiated in layers of bidirectionally connected 
nodes. DORA learns propositional representations from examples of representations like those in (a).  
 
DORA learns representations of a form we call LISAese (Figure S2B) via unsupervised 
learning (described in full below). Propositions in LISAese are coded by layers of units in a 
connectionist computing framework (Figure S2B). At the bottom of the hierarchy, feature (or 
semantic) nodes code for the featural properties of represented instances in a distributed 
manner. At the next layer, localist predicate and object units (POs) conjunctively code 
collections of semantic units into representations of objects and roles. At the next layer localist 
role-binding units (RBs) conjunctively bind object and role POs into linked role-filler pairs. 
Finally, proposition units (Ps) link RBs to form whole relational structures. Ps, RBs, and POs 
are our labels for the three layers of units in LTM, with POs the layer of units connected to the 
feature unit bank.  
 
We use the term analog to refer to a complete story, event, or situation (e.g., from a single 
object in isolation, to a full propostion in LISAese). Analogs are represented by a collection of 
token units (P, RB and PO). Token units are not duplicated within an analog (e.g., within an 
analog, each proposition that refers to Don connects to the same “Don” unit). Separate analogs 
do have non-identical token units (e.g., Don will be represented by one PO unit in one analog 
and by a different PO in another analog). The feature units thus represent general type 
information and token units represent instantiations (or tokens) of those types in specific 
analogs (15,16,20).  
 
In short, processing in DORA works as follows. Units in FOA become active (i.e., they are 
brought to DORA’s attention). Units in FOA pass activation to the semantic units. Because the 
semantic units are shared by propositions in all sets, activation flows from FOA to propositions 
in the other three sets. All of DORA’s operations (i.e., retrieval, mapping, predicate learning, 
relation formation, schema induction, and generalization, see below) proceed as a product of 
the units in FOA activating semantic units, which in turn activate units in the various other sets 
(as detailed below).  
 
The model is based on a core set of neurocomputational computing principles. The model 
assumes (a) a layered architecture, with banks of layered units connected to a common pool of 
feature units. (b) Lateral inhibition between units in the layered banks. (c) Yoked inhibitors on 
units that accumulate input from their yoked units, and units at higher layers. (d) The capacity 
for Hebbian learning. There is ample evidence for all of these basic assumptions in the human 
neuroscience literature (64).  
 
(A) (B)
larger cupsmallerball
Ps
RBs
POs
Features/semantics
smaller+balllarger+cup
bigger (cup, ball)
ball
POs
Features/semantics
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Sequence of events in DORA 
 
The general sequence of events in DORA’s operation is outlined below. Fig. 3 also provides 
an outline of the general processing algorithm in DORA. The details of each steps, along with 
the relevant equations and parameter values, are provided in the subsections that follow. DORA 
is very robust to the values of the parameters (see 20). Throughout the equations in this section, 
we will use the variable a to denote a unit’s activation, n its (net) input, and wij to denote the 
connection from unit i to unit j.  
 
An analog, D (selected at random, or based on the current game screen) enters FOA. Network 
activations are initialized to 0, and the firing order, C, or propositions in D is selected (for the 
current simulations, this selection is random and inconsequential, however, see (15) for a 
detailed description of how a system like DORA can set its own firing order according to the 
constraints of pragmatic centrality and text coherence). DORA can perform SRM calculation, 
do retrieval from LTM, perform analogical mapping, and do comparison-based unsupervised 
learning. Currently, the order of operations of these routines is fixed and set to the order: 
retrieval, SRM calculation, mapping, learning.  
 
Step 1: Do basic SRM calculation  
 
Behaviour of the SRM circuit as well as how this circuit is learned are described in the Methods section. 
During SRM, PO units get input by the equation:  
 𝑛$ = ∑ 𝑎&𝑤$&&1 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑗) −a𝑎;; 	, 
(S1) 
 
where where j are semantic units connected to i, num(j) is the number of semantic units j, and k are 
other PO units in the FOA. Activation of PO units is calculated by the leaky integrator function in EQ. 
S8.  
 
Step 2. DORA operations 
 
Repeat the following until each RB in D has fired three times if mapping, or once, otherwise.  
 
Step 2.1. Update mode of all P units in FOA and AM 
 
P units in all propositions operate in one of three modes: Parent, child, and neutral (15,16,20). 
P mode is important for representing higher-order relations (e.g., R1(x, R2(y, z)); 14). In the 
current simulations, P mode did not need to change. We include this information here for the 
purposes of completeness.  
 
Step 2.2. Update input to all token units in FOA 
 
Token units in the FOA update their input by the equation:  
 𝑛$ = 	a𝑎&𝑤$&𝐺& −a𝑎;; − 𝑠a3𝑎p − 10𝐼$	,p  
(S2) 
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where j are all units above unit i (i.e., Ps for RBs, RBs for POs), G is a gain parameter attached 
to the weight between the RB and its POs (POs learned via DORA’s comparison-based 
predication algorithm—and thus with mode=1—have G=2 and 1 otherwise), k is all units in 
the FOA in the same layer as i (for POs, k is only those POs not connected to the same RB as 
unit i, and any P units currently in child mode; but see item m, from Eq. S2), m are PO units 
that are connected to the same RB (or RBs) as i, and Ii is the activation of the PO inhibitor 
yoked to i. When DORA is operating in binding-by-asynchrony mode, s = 1; when it is 
operating in binding-by-synchrony mode (i.e., like LISA), s = 0.  
 
Step 2.3. Update input to the PO and RB inhibitors 
 
Every RB and PO unit is yoked to an inhibitor unit i. Both RB and PO inhibitors integrate input 
over time as:  
 𝑛$(qrN) = 𝑛$(q) +a𝑎&𝑤$&	,& 	
                                     (S3) 
 
where t refers to the current iteration, j is the RB or PO unit yoked to inhibitor unit i, and wij is 
the weight between RB or PO inhibitor i and its yoked RB or PO unit (set to 1). Inhibitor units 
become active (ai = 1) when ni is greater than the activation threshold (=220). RB inhibitors 
are yoked only to their corresponding RB. PO inhibitors are yoked both to their corresponding 
PO and all RB units in the same analog. As a result, at any given instant, PO inhibitors receive 
twice as much input as RB inhibitors, and reach their activation threshold twice as fast. POs, 
therefore, oscillate twice as fast as RBs. PO and RB inhibitors establish the time-sharing that 
carries role-filler binding information and allows DORA to dynamically bind roles to fillers. 
All PO and RB inhibitors become refreshed (ai = 0 and ni = 0) when the global inhibitor (GG; 
described below) fires.  
 
Step 2.4. Update the local and global inhibitors 
 
The local and global inhibitors, GL and GG respectively (see e.g., 65-71), serve to allow units 
in AM to keep pace with firing of units in FOA. The local inhibitor is inhibited to inactivity 
(GL = 0) by any PO in FOA with activation above QL (= 0.5), and becomes active (GL = 10) 
when no PO in FOA has an activity above QL. During phase-lag-1 binding, the predicate and 
object POs time-share. There is a period during the firing of each role-filler pair after the one 
PO fires and before the other PO becomes active when no PO in FOA is very active. During 
this time the local inhibitor becomes active and inhibits all PO units in AM to inactivity. 
Effectively, GL serves as a local refresh signal, punctuating the change from predicate to object 
or object to predicate firing in FOA, and allowing the units in AM to keep pace with units in 
FOA.  
 
The global inhibitor works similarly. It is inhibited to inactivity (GG = 0) by any RB in FOA 
with activation above QG (= 0.5) and becomes active (GG = 10) when no RB in FOA is active 
above threshold. During the transition between RBs in FOA there is a brief period when no 
FOA RB are active above QG. During this time GG inhibits all units in AM to inactivity, 
allowing units in AM to keep pace with units in FOA.  
 
Step 2.5. Update input to semantic units 
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Semantic units update their input as: 
 𝑛$ = a 𝑎&𝑤$&&∈s∈(t,u) 	 ,	
                                      (S4) 
 
where j is all PO units in S, which is the set of propositions in FOA, D, and AM R, and wij is 
the weight between PO unit j and semantic unit i.  
 
Step 2.6. Update input to token units in AM and EM 
 
Input to all token units in AM and emergent AM are not updated for the first 5 iterations after 
the global or local inhibitor fires.  
 
All token units in AM and EM update their input by the equation:  
 𝑛$ = 	a𝑎&𝑤$&& + 𝑆𝐸𝑀$ + 𝑀$ −a𝑎;; − 𝑠a3𝑎pp −a𝑎(( − Γx − Γ=	,	
(S5) 
 
where j is are any units above token unit i (i.e., P units for RBs, RB units for POs; input from 
j is only included on phase sets beyond the first), SEMi is the semantic input to unit i if unit i 
is a PO, and 0 otherwise, Mi is the mapping input to unit i, k is all units in either AM (if unit i 
is in AM) or EM (if unit i is in EM) in the same layer as i (for POs, k is only those POs not 
connected to the same RB as unit i, and any P units currently in child mode; but see item m, 
from Eq. S5), m is PO units connected to the same RB (or RBs) as i (or 0 for non-PO tokens), 
and n is units above unit i to which unit i is not connected. When DORA is operating in binding-
by-asynchrony mode, s = 1; when it is operating in binding-by-synchrony mode (i.e., like 
LISA), s = 0. SEMi , the semantic input to i, is calculated as: 
 
    𝑆𝐸𝑀$ = ∑ 𝑎&𝑤$&&1 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑗)	 ,	
                                          (S6) 
 
where j are semantic units, wij is the weight between semantic unit j and PO unit i, and num(j) 
is the total number of semantic units i is connected to with a weight above q (=0.1) (see 
15,16,50). Mi is the mapping input to i:  
 
   𝑀$ = a𝑎& y3𝑤$& − 𝑀𝑎𝑥"𝑀𝑎𝑝(𝑖)) − 𝑀𝑎𝑥"𝑀𝑎𝑝(𝑗))| ,& 	
 (S7) 
 
where j are token units of the same type as i in FOA (e.g., if i is a RB unit, j is all RB units in 
FOA), Max(Map(i)) is the highest of all unit i’s mapping connections, and Max(Map(j)) is the 
highest of all unit j’s mapping connections. As a result of Eq. S7, an active token unit in FOA 
will excite any AM unit to which it maps and inhibit all AM units of the same type to which it 
does not map. 
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Step 2.7. Update activations of all units in the network 
 
All token units in DORA update their activation by the leaky integrator function: 
 ∆𝑎$ = 𝛾𝑛$(1.1 − 𝑎$) − 𝛿𝑎$]N	,                                         (S8) 
 
where Dai is the change in activation of unit i, g (=0.3) is a growth parameter, ni is the net input 
to unit i, and d (=0.1) is a decay parameter. Semantic units update their activation by the 
equation:  
 𝑎$ = 𝑛$max	(𝑛$)	 ,	
                                                    (S9) 
 
where ai is the activation of semantic unit i, ni is the net input to semantic unit i, and max(ni) is 
the maximum input to any semantic unit. There is physiological evidence for divisive 
normalization in the feline visual system (e.g., 42-44) and psychophysical evidence for divisive 
normalization in human vision (e.g., 45,46).  
 
RB and PO inhibitors, i, update their activations according to a threshold function: 
 𝑎$ = 1, 𝑛$ > Θ0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 	 ,	
                                            (S10) 
 
where QIN = 220. 
 
Step 2.8. Update all mapping hypotheses 
  
During the mapping process, DORA learns mapping hypotheses between all token units in 
FOA and token units of the same type in AM (i.e., between P units, between RB units and 
between PO units in the same mode [described below]). Mapping hypotheses initialize to zero 
at the beginning of a phase set. The mapping hypothesis between a FOA unit and an AM unit 
of the same type is updated by the equation:  
 
               ∆ℎ$&q = 𝑎$q𝑎&q ,                                                      (S11) 
 
where ait is the activation of FOA unit i at time t.  
 
Step 2.9 Run retrieval 
 
DORA uses a variant of the retrieval routine described by (15).  
 
Step 2.10. Run comparison-based unsupervised learning 
 
DORA’s comparison-based learning (CBL) routines are unsupervised. In the current version 
of the model, learning is licensed whenever 70% of FOA token units map to AM items (this 
70% criterion is arbitrary, and in practice 100% of the units nearly always map). If learning is 
licensed DORA runs unsupervised learning. If FOA contains single objects, not yet bound to 
any predicates (i.e., each RB in FOA is bound only to a single PO), then DORA runs 
comparison-based predication learning. Otherwise, DORA runs refinement learning.  
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Step 2.10.1. Predicate learning 
 
During comparison-based predicate learning (CBP) DORA attempts to recruit token units to 
learn conjunctive representations of units at lower layers. When only POs are active in AM, 
DORA recruits a new PO unit (i.e., a PO connected to no semantic features) in AM. The mode 
of the recruited PO is set to 1.  
 
During CBP, DORA also attempts to recruit units in token layers above layers with active token 
units (e.g., in the RB layer if POs are active, or the P layer if RBs are active). As a result of 
lateral inhibition, if any tokens are already active in a layer, then the recruited unit cannot not 
become active. However, if no other token unit are active in a layer, the recruited unit can 
become active. The activation of any active recruited units is clamped to 1.o and remains at 1 
until GG or GL fires. Connections between the new PO and all active semantics by the equation: 
 ∆𝑤$& = 𝑎$"𝑎& − 𝑤$&)𝛾                                                      (S12) 
 
where Δwij is the change in weight between the new PO unit, i, and semantic unit, j, ai and aj 
are the activations of i and j, respectively, and γ is a growth rate parameter. Connections 
between corresponding active token units (i.e., between P and RB, or RB and PO units) are 
also updated by Eq. S12, where I is the recruited unit, and j a a token units in a adjacent layers. 
In this present code, the process of recruiting units during CBL is accomplished by fiat, but 
several neutrally-plausible solutions to the problem of unit recruitment have been proposed, 
including those described in previous DORA papers (e.g., 20; see also 72).  
 
Thus, DORA exploits the temporal pattern that emerges when sets corresponding objects are 
compared to learn representations of single-place predicates, and the temporal pattern that 
emerges when sets of corresponding of role-filler pairs are mapped in order to link RBs into 
multi-place relations. When the phase set ends, connection weights between the new P unit i 
and any RBs to which it has connections, j, are updated by the equation: 
 
         𝑤$& = 1, 𝑤$& > 0	anda𝑤$; ≥; 20, otherwise 	 ,	
                                      (S13) 
 
for P unit i and RB unit j, and k is all RB units (including j) in AM.  
 
Step 2.10.2. Refinement Learning 
 
Step 2.10.2.1: Predicate refinement. For any PO in FOA that is currently active, and maps to 
a unit in AM with a mapping connection above the threshold QMAP (=0.7), DORA infers a PO 
unit connected to no semantic features in the EM with a mapping connection to the active FOA 
unit. DORA learns connections between the new PO and all active semantics by Eq. S12. 
DORA also licenses self-supervised learning (SSL). During SSL, DORA infers token units in 
the EM that match active tokens in D (FOA). Specifically, DORA infers a structure unit in the 
EM in response to any unmapped token unit in D. If unit j in D maps to nothing in the EM, 
then when j fires, it will send a global inhibitory signal to all units in the EM (Eq. S7). This 
uniform inhibition, unaccompanied by any excitation in AM us a signal that DORA exploits, 
and infers a unit of the same type (i.e., P, RB, PO) in the EM. Inferred PO units in the EM have 
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the same mode as the active PO in FOA. The activation of each inferred unit in the EM is set 
to 1. DORA learns connections between corresponding active tokens in the EM (i.e., between 
P and RB units. and between RB and PO units) by Eq. S12 (where unit j is the newly inferred 
token unit, and unit i is any other active token unit). To keep DORA’s representations 
manageable (and decrease the runtime of the simulations), at the end of the phase set, we 
discard any connections between semantic units and POs whose weights are less than 0.1.  
 
Step 2.10.2.2: Relational generalisation. The relational generalisation algorithm is a self-
supervised learning algorithm adopted from that used in (16). During self-supervised learning, 
if no token units are active in AM to match active token units in FOA, DORA will activate 
token units in AM that match active token units in FOA. As detailed in Eq. S7, when a token 
unit j in FOA is active, it will produce a global inhibitory signal to all AM units to which it 
does not map. A uniform inhibition in AM signals DORA to activate a unit of the same type 
(i.e., P, RB, PO) in AM as the active token unit in FOA. DORA learns connections between 
corresponding active tokens in the EM (i.e., between P and RB units. and between RB and PO 
units) by the simple Hebbian learning rule in Eq. S12 (where unit j is the newly active token 
unit, and unit i is the other active token unit). Connections between PO units and semantic units 
are updated by Eq. S12.  
 
Step 3. Update mapping connections 
 
Mapping connections are updated at the end of each phase set. First, all mapping hypotheses 
are normalized by the equation: 
 ℎ$& =  hLK"h,) − 𝑀𝐴𝑋(ℎ;) ,                                              (S14) 
 
where, hij is the mapping hypothesis between units i and j, MAX(hi, hj) is the largest hypothesis 
involving either unit i or unit j, and MAX(hkl) is the largest mapping hypothesis where either 
k=i and l¹j, or l=j and k¹i. That is, each mapping hypothesis is normalised divisively: Each 
mapping hypothesis, hij between units i and j, is divided by the largest hypothesis involving 
either unit i or j. Next each mapping hypothesis is normalized subtractively: The value of the 
largest hypothesis involving either i or j (not including hij itself) is subtracted from hij. The 
divisive normalization keeps the mapping hypotheses bounded between zero and one, and the 
subtractive normalization implements the one-to-one mapping constraint by forcing mapping 
hypotheses involving the same i or j to compete with one another (see 7). Finally, the mapping 
weights between each unit in FOA and the token units in AM of the same type are updated by 
the equation: 
 
         ∆𝑤$& = 𝜂"1.1 − 𝑤$&)ℎ$&]N ,                                             (S15) 
 
where Δwij is the change in the mapping connection weight between FOA unit i and AM unit 
j, hij is the mapping hypothesis between unit i and unit j, η is a growth parameter, and Δwij is 
truncated for values below 0 and above 1. After each phase set, mapping hypotheses are reset 
to 0. The mapping process continues for three phase sets.  
 
Supplemental results 
 
Additional tests of the symbolic adequacy of the learned representations  
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The representations that DORA learns should behave like structured relational representations. 
That is, the representations DORA learns must meet the requirements of human relational 
representations. While almost any structured representations will support analogical mapping 
some more substantive hallmarks of relational representations (see 22, 73) are that they, (i) 
form the basis for solving cross mappings; (ii) support mapping similar, but non-identical 
predicates; (iii) support mapping objects with no featural overlap, including completely novel 
objects, if they play similar roles; and (iv) form the basis of overcoming the n-ary restriction.  
 
During a cross-mapping, an object (object1) is mapped to a featurally less similar object 
(object2) rather than a featurally more similar object (object3) because it (object1) plays the 
same role as the less similar object (object2). For example, if cat1 chases mouse1 and mouse2 
chases cat2, then the structural analogical mapping places cat1 into correspondence with 
mouse2 because both play the chaser role. The ability to find such a mapping is a key property 
of genuinely relational (i.e., as opposed to feature-based) processing (see, e.g., 73-76). Cross-
mappings serve as a stringent test of the structure sensitivity of a representation as they require 
violating featural or statistical similarity.  
 
We tested the relations that DORA had learned in the previous part of this simulation for their 
ability to support cross-mappings. We selected two of the refined relations that DORA had 
learned previously at random, such that both selected representations coded for the same 
relation (e.g., both coded for taller, or both coded for same-width). We bound the relations to 
new objects, creating two new propositions, P1 and P2 such that the agent of P1 was 
semantically identical to the patient of P2 and patient of P1 was semantically identical to the 
agent of P2. For example, P1 might be taller (square, circle) and P2 might be taller (circle, 
square). DORA then attempted to map P1 onto P2. We were interested in whether DORA 
would map the square in P1 onto the circle in P2 (the correct relational mapping) or simply 
map the square to the square and the circle to the circle.  We repeated this procedure 10 times 
(each time with a different randomly-chosen pair of relations). In each simulation, DORA 
successfully mapped the square in P1 to the circle in P2 and vice-versa (because of their 
bindings to mapped relational roles).  DORA’s success indicates that the relations it learned in 
the first part of this simulation satisfy the requirement of supporting cross-mapping. DORA 
successfully solves cross-mappings because the correspondences that emerge between 
matching predicates and their corresponding RBs, during asynchronous binding force 
relationally similar objects into correspondence. For example, consider a case when DORA 
attempts to map taller (square, circle) in the focus of attention, and taller (circle, square) in the 
active memory. When the more-height+square role-binding becomes active in the focus of 
attention, because of asynchronous binding, the units coding for more-height will become 
active first, followed by the units coding for square. When more-height is active in the focus 
of attention, it will activate more-height and its corresponding RB, more-height+circle, in the 
active memory. When the units coding for square subsequently become active in the focus of 
attention, the active more-height+circle RB unit in the active memory (already in 
correspondence with the active more-height+square RB unit in the focus of attention) will 
activate the square unit, thus putting circle and square into correspondence, and allowing 
DORA to map them.  
 
We then tested whether the relations that DORA had learned would support mapping to similar 
but non-identical relations (such as mapping taller to greater-than) and would support mapping 
objects with no semantic over-lap, including novel objects, that play similar roles. Humans 
successfully map such relations (22, 73), an ability that depends on the semantic-richness of 
our relational representations. We selected two of the refined relations that DORA had learned 
during the previous part of this simulation, R1 and R2 (e.g, taller(x,y) or wider(x,y)). Crucially, 
R1 and R2 both coded for SRM across different dimensions (e.g., if R1 coded taller, then R2 
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coded wider). Thus, each role in R1 shared 50% of its semantics with a corresponding role in 
R2 (e.g., the role more-height has 50% of its semantics in common with the role more-width). 
To assure that no mappings would be based on object similarity, none of the objects that served 
as arguments of the relations had any semantic overlap at all. To ensure that the mapping would 
work with completely novel objects, we created objects composed from semantic units that we 
added to DORA solely for these simulations (i.e., these were semantic units DORA had not 
“experienced” previously). We repeated this process 10 times, each time with a different pair 
of relations from DORA’s LTM. Each time, DORA mapped the agent role of R1 to the agent 
role of R2 and the patient role of R1 to the patient role of R2, and, despite their lack of semantic 
overlap, corresponding objects always mapped to one another (because of their bindings to 
mapped roles).  
 
Finally, we tested whether the representations that DORA had learned would support violating 
the n-ary restriction: the restriction that an n-place predicate may not map to an m-place 
predicate when n ≠ m. Almost all models of structured cognition follow the n-ary restriction 
(namely, those that represent propositions using traditional propositional notation and its 
isomorphs; see 15). However, this limitation does not appear to apply to human reasoning, as 
evidenced by our ability to easily find correspondences between, say, bigger (Sam, Larry) on 
the one hand and small (Joyce) or big (Susan), on the other (74).  
 
To test DORA’s ability to violate the n-ary restriction, we randomly selected a refined relation, 
R1, that DORA had learned in the previous part of this simulation. We then created a single 
place predicate (r2) that shared 50% of its semantics with the agent role of R1 and none of its 
semantics with the patient role. The objects bound to the agent and patient role of R1 each 
shared 50% of their semantics with the object bound to r2. DORA attempted to map R1 to r2. 
We repeated this process 10 times, each time with a different relation from DORA’s LTM, and 
each time DORA successfully mapped the agent role of R1 to r2, along with their arguments. 
We then repeated the simulation such that r2 shared half its semantic content with the patient 
(rather than agent) role of R1. In 10 additional simulations, DORA successfully mapped the 
patient role of R1 to r2 (along with their arguments).  In short, in all our simulations DORA 
overcame the n-ary restriction, mapping the single-place predicate r2 onto the most similar 
relational role of the multi-place relation R1.  
 
Finally, as noted above, DORA also learned representations of greater (x,y) and same (x,y) that 
were independent of any particular dimensions (i.e., relations that coded strongly for only the 
invariant features of more & less and same, that were otherwise not strongly connected to any 
other semantic features). Importantly, these representations also met all the requirements of 
structured relational representations. We ran the exact same tests for cross-mapping, mapping 
arguments with no semantic overlap based on shared roles, and violating the n-ary restriction 
that are described above, but using the representations of abstract magnitude (i.e., greater (x,y)) 
that DORA had learned during training. Just as with DORA’s dimensional SRM 
representations, DORA’s more abstract SRM representations successfully performed a cross-
mapping in 10 out of 10 simulations, mapped arguments with no semantic overlap based only 
on shared roles in 10 out of 10 simulations and overcame the n-ary restriction in 10 out of 10 
simulations.  
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